How to compete for the production of green products with non-green products is essential in these markets. This research focuses on the pricing and determination of the degree of greenness of a product in competition with a non-green product in different structures. In all structures, we considered two manufacturers that a green product produced by one manufacturer and a non-green product produced by a second manufacturer. In the first problem, investigates the pricing of two substitute products, a green product produced by one manufacturer and a non-green product produced by a second manufacturer, under two dual-channel supply chains, including retail and Internet channels. The decision variables for one manufacturer are the price and degrees of eco-friendliness of the green product; for the other, the decision variable is the price of the non-green product. The problem is solved and compared to two scenarios. Finally, both parametric and numerical analyses are presented, and some managerial insights are provided and some of which are as follows: The centralized scenario cause to achieve high the green degree comparing with the decentralized scenario. In the second problem, two manufacturers deliver their products to the retailer using a logistics company. The manufacturers use the 3PL company, mainly because it is a form of green traort and customer satisfaction with the delivery time of products to the retailer. This paper examines the products' pricing, the greenness determination of the first manufacturer’s product and the 3PL’s variables, including the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and the delivery time. Three scenarios have been used to solve this problem, which involves a centralized game and two decentralized games. The results show that establishing competition between the SC members to obtain greater profitability and an acceptable level of sustainability indicator is essential. In the decentralized Stackelberg game between the manufacturers, the manufacturers earn the highest profit. In the centralized game, the product greenness is the lowest, and in the decentralized game when 3PL is the leader, the product greenness is the highest. In the third problem, there are two manufacturers, two retailers, and a 3PL. Green products and non-green alternative products are sent to customers through the Internet and retail channels. Products are sent by a 3PL that uses green traortation to reduce the carbon footprint for retailers. In this problem, pricing policies and the degree of greenness of the products, the amount of carbon emissions and the delivery times of products in different channels are investigated. The issue was solved with cooperation and non-cooperation scenarios and results, and management insights were presented. For example, the results show that avoiding cooperation and collusion between players should be reducing the carbon footprint, saving energy, increasing the product's green level and create satisfaction for customers. Increasing public awareness through the use of green traortation (carbon footprint) and the purchase of green products is a major contributor to protecting green logistics providers and providers.