In recent decades, water is the most important element to develop countries and the water shortage causes conflict among the users. Climate changes, population growth, timely and regional uneven distribution of water resources, are the factors that causing water shortages. One of the solutions for solving the shortage of water resources problem is water transfer from basin with appropriate water resources to another basin. Usually, by Inter basin water transfer, origin basin due to economic activity increase associated with benefit and destination basin because of economic activity reduction face with detriment. Therefore, water allocation and solving conflicts among decision-makers is one of the most important issues in water transfer projects. Game theory techniques provide an effective and accurate language to discuss water sources conflict and it can consider the desirability, disagreements, decision-makers relative power and reallocation among claims. The central Plateau of Iran is facing with water shortage and managers suggest water transfer for solving the problem. In this thesis, Beheshtabad water transfer project has been studied which transfers water from Karun basin to Gavkhuni basin. For water allocating to users, four scenarios are defined include, water transfer, increasing water demand and agricultural efficiency improvement. MODSIM model for water resource allocation is used according to historical policy for each scenario that is considered as initial allocation. The results of this section indicate the water resources allocation to users before Beheshtabad project. Then, considering Beheshtabad project and game theory is used to resolve conflict. In order to solve conflicts, Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches were used. Gavkhoni agricultural, Gavkhoni industry and Karun agriculture are three players in cooperative approach and for non-cooperative approach two-player are defined including, Gavkhoni basin and Karun basin. Considering different coalitions among players, the benefits of the overall coalition has the greatest value. In cooperative approach with the reallocation, benefits of all players are more than the initial conditions. Gatly index were used to assess the cooperation rate among the players which shows players intent for coalition removal. The index for Gavkhoni industry and Karun agriculture is approximately 1 and for Gavkhoni agriculture is more than one. In addition, considering Gatly index, two players include Gavkhoni industry and Karun agriculture; play an important role in forming a coalition. In the non-cooperative game theory, game equilibrium has been investigated by using four indicators includes Nash equilibrium, General Metarationality (GMR), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) and Sequential Stability (SEQ). Non-cooperative game theory results shows that by water transfer and incentive payment of the Gavkhoni basin, game equilibrium goes to Non-cooperation and Karun basin disagrees with water transfer. The incentive payment of Gavkhoni basin, game equilibrium goes from Non-cooperation to the cooperation. Cooperation among the two basins is done when Karun basin accept water transfer and Gavkhoni incentive payment to Karun basin stay in the game. The amount of the incentive payment in scenario 1 is 751.15 billion toman, Scenario 2, 7454 billion toman, Scenario 3, 740.3 billion toman and Scenario 4, 771.4 billion toman. Keywords: water transfer, water allocation, conflict resolve, game theory, cooperative approach, non-cooperative approach, incentive payment