With the spread of malicious activities in the computer network, organizations have been trying to find a mechanism to identify unauthorized activities, deceive adversary, and control network attacks. Publishing incorrect information is one of the ways to deceive attacker by the defender, in such a way that an attacker with uncertainty about the accuracy of the published information, distracts from his main objective; this will reduce the possibility of successful attack. On the other hand, attackers in some case plan to deceive the defender to increase their chances of success. Despite all common deceptive scenarios, there are not mathematical tool to compare and predict the behavior of attacker and defender i different network. Our goal in this thesis is to introduce deceptive modeling tool in the system based on a game-theoretical model between attacher and the defender. We use a dynamic game with incomplete information to model the interactions between an attacker and a defender. A medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; LINE-HEIGHT: 16pt; MARGIN: 0in 0in 12pt; TEXT-AUTOSPACE: ; BORDER-TOP: medium none; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; mso-pagination: none; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-padding-alt: 0in 0in 0in 0in" 1-Game Theory, 2-Signaling Game, 3-Deception, 4-Network Security
