Multi-hop routing can be considered as one of the basic and fundamental protocols in the establishment of wireless ad hoc networks. Several routing protocols have been proposed in order to overcome the problems imposed by node mobility, frequent topology changes, distributed nature and also the lack of any centralized pre-established infrastructure in ad hoc networks. In the design of these routing protocols, it has been assumed that there is a secure wireless channel in the network. Moreover, the trustworthy nodes are assumed to cooperate with each other in the execution of the routing protocols. However, these assumptions are not completely valid in practical ad hoc networks. In other words, there are some insider and outsider adversarial nodes in such networks trying to disrupt the normal functionality of the routing protocols or not to participate in the cooperation mandated by such protocols in order to maintain their limited energy or processing resources. Therefore, ad hoc routing protocols are vulnerable to several types of attacks. On the other hand, specific ad hoc network applications are mainly in the battlefields, rescue and disaster relief operations and also in such environments in which there is no well-established infrastructure like that in other wireless networks. These types of applications impose further security threats against the functionality of the routing protocols in ad hoc networks. Due to these unique characteristics and vulnerabilities, the security of the routing in such networks is quite important. In this thesis, the main