Blockchain, Game Theroy, Distributed Ledger, PoS, Sharding, Byzantine Agreement Protocols Duo to the daily growth of the Internet and Internet systems, data holders and producers power increases simultaneously. Besides, The centralization in data holding and internet systems administration is another important problem. This centralization gives administrators the ability of censor, Denial of Service, data manipulation, etc. These concerns solved by introducing Blockchain as the core of a cryptocurrency named Bitcoin. Over time, Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology have used in many other applications. It has revealed drawbacks in the traditional blockchains such as scalability, finality, energy-efficiency, etc. The existence of mining pools also has produced some new issues on the centrality of blockchains. Hence, many new works focused on solving these problems in traditional blockchains. We can Unless Sharding and PoS blockchains have solved many blockchain issues, they have not considered the incentive-compatibility of their protocols. We have analyzed these protocols and proved that there is no incentive for rational nodes to cooperate while the rewards share in the way these works proposed. Hence, the defection of these nodes can lead the system to fail (no new block added). In this work, we have analyzed new blockchain protocols (i.e., PoS and Sharded blockchains) and explained their problem on incentivizing their users to cooperated. Then, we have designed novel incentive-compatible approaches to share the rewards and guaranteed the cooperation of the maximum set of nodes. However, in some cases, we share fewer rewards than the main protocol does with guaranteeing the cooperation simultaneously
