This paper focuses on the competition between maritime and multimodal (ship-rail) shipping agencies in a freight traortation market with a game theoretic approach. Depending on the railway infrastructure condition, two scenarios of the railway systems are considered: Flexible and inflexible systems.The shipping price of each mode and the delivery time of the multimodal shipping agent are considered as the decision variables. In Scenario 1, the values of decision variables are acquired simultaneously in Nash equilibrium. In Scenario 2, the competition follows a Stackelberg structure wherein the multimodal delivery time is ascertained beforehand and then the equilibrium delivery prices of both modes are attained in a Nash equilibrium. The competition in freight traortation market is modeled for each scenario and the effects of different technical and economic policies are analyzed by studying the equilibrium values of decision variables as well as the resultant values of demand and utility functions. The following policies are considered for analysis: Altering railway system flexibility, Increasing train fuel price, Decreasing external costs in multimodal shipping, Improving railway systems (infrastructurally and operationally), Increasing railway toll, Employing modern ships in maritime shipping. In this study, maritime and multimodal (ship-rail) ) shipping Corridors etween the two countries India and Turkey, As a competing corridor, have been evaluated. Assessment of railway system flexibility with respect to different criteria and beneficiaries how favorable Multimodal shipping customers to use inflexible rail system compared to flexible rail system for the Multimodal shipping equilibrium price, favorable Maritime shipping customers to use flexible rail system compared to inflexible rail system for the Maritime shipping equilibrium price, favorable Multimodal shipping customers to use flexible rail system compared to inflexible rail system for the Multimodal shipping delivery time and favorable Both multimodal and maritime agents to use inflexible rail system compared to flexible rail system for the Agents’ utility.These findings provide a firm ground on which traortation managers, policy makers, and service providers can make decisions more confidently in competitive freight traortation markets. Keywords: Freight traortation; Pricing; Game theory; policy making; maritime traortation; Multimodal shipping; delivery time
