High penetrated wind farm biding behavior in theelectricity market is assessed in this dissertation. How their behaviors affect the rivals and how they areaffected by the behaviors manifested by the otherplayers is studied. First of all, renewable energy supplementary polices are reviewedin several countries. Then, the effect of wind farms on the electricity pricesis evaluated in Denmark using real electricity market data. Knowing the biddingbehaviors manifested by the high penetrated wind farms, the reasons of windfarms bid-shading behavior are discussed. Introducing newindices, the wind farm bidding behavior is categorized into conservative andrisk prone behaviors. Then, the effect of changing the market clearingmechanism from uniform-price to pay-as-bid is assessed on the bidding behaviorof the wind farms. Considering the merit-order effect caused by the highpenetrated wind farms, it is discussed that how the right and wrong players’believes affect their pay-off. To do so, a Bayesian-Cournot game is modeled.The players’ private information are turned into their believes using belieffunctions that are defined by the theory of evidence. Informational surfacesare introduced to ease the understanding of players’ information policies.Finally, risky power market is introduced and its advantages are studied. Inthis study, wind power producers are modeled as players that have price makingcapability. Wind power producers and fossil fuel power plants constitute thegeneration portfolio of the generation companies. The electricity trades in theday-ahead market, real-time market, and the risky power intraday market aremodeled. To do so, an EPEC is established and solved maximizing the generationcompanies profit. Risky power trades reduce the uncertainty of wind powerproducers via trading in the risky power market. In addition, it reduces thereal-time wind spillage and increases the wind power producers’ profit.
