Cooperation logics have recently begun to attract attention within the multi-agent systems. Using a cooperation logic, it is possible to represent and reason about the strategic powers of agents and coalitions of agents in game- like multi-agent system. These powers are generally assumed to be implicitly defined within the structure of the environment, and their origin has been rarely discussed. In this thesis, we study a coopration logic in which agents are each assumed to control a set of propositional variables the powers of agents and coalitions the derive from the allocation of propositions to agents. After motivating and introducing CL-PC, we study a complete axiom system for the logic, is provided the issue of characterizing control in CL-PC with respect to the underlying power structures of the logic, and formally study the relationship between CL-PC and Paulys Coalitions logic. We then show that the model checking and satisfaibility problems for CL-PC are both ACE-complete. We study DCL-PC: a logic for reasoning about how the abilities of agent and coalitions of agents are altered by transferring control from one agent to another. DCL-PC extends CL-PC with dynamic logic modalities in which atomic programs are of the form agent i gives control of variable p to agent j; and test operators to form complex programs. By combining such dynamic transfer programs with cooperation modalities, it becomes possible to reason about how the power of agents and coalitions is affected by the transfer of control. Then we study two alternative semantics for the logic: a direct semantics, in which we capture the distributions of Boolean variables to agents; and a more conventional Kripke semantic. That these semantics are proved to be equivalent, and then is presented an axiomatization for the logic. We investigate the computational complexity of model checking and satisfaibility for DCL-PC, and show that both problems are ACE-complete (and hence no worse than the underlying logic CL-PC). Finally, we study the characterization of control in DCL-PC. We distinguish between first-order control the ability of an agent or coalition to control some state of affairs through the assignment of values to the variables under the control of the agent or coalition and second- order control the ability of an agent to exert control over the control that other agents have by transferring variables to other agents. A logical characterization of second-order control is given. As an application for DCL-PC, we consider a domino game and give a complex axiomatization for it.