In this study, We investigated the coordination mechanism for a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers when the demands and the production cost of the manufacturer are disrupted. This differs from conventional supply chain coordination models under a static case. We considered the scenario of the problem that retailers bear deviation costs; the supply chain is to be coordinated by a linear quantity discount schedule. In this case, It was discussed how the supply chain is coordinated, and how it differs from the original planned scheme. Some interesting managerial observations were obtained ; for example, the discount slope is unchanged when the value of linear combination of cost and demand disruptions are small, and If the value of above linear combination are small for a retailer, then he should keep the original order quantity, although the other retailer may order a different quantity. The case when the manufacturer cannot timely react to the disruptions and she should keep the original mechanism, in that case the equilibrium strategies of the retailers were investigated. To illustrate the theoretical results, a numerical example was also given. Keywords: Coordination mechanism; Supply chain management; Disruption management; Game theory
