Energy consumption plays a significant role in the environmental aspectof energy usage and its economic performance. For the first time, this paperestablishes a game theoretic approach to pricing two substitute energies andalso two substitutable energy-consuming products considering consumer environmentalawareness and Governmental financial interventions. We consider a supply chainconsisting of two energy suppliers and two manufacturers of energy-consumingproducts and the government. The first manufacturer’s product is adjusted touse only the first type of energy, while the second manufacturer’s product,namely a hybrid product, can use both energies as substitutes. The differencebetween the two energies is their pollutant emissions and usage costs.This problem is solvedunder different conditions, and the equilibrium prices of products and energies,their demands, and each agent’s profit are examined and compared. Finally,sensitivity analysis and numerical analysis are presented and some managerialinsights are provided. The results reveal that using hybrid products leads toincreases in the demand for clean energy and diminishes the demand for thesubstitute energy. Also, manufacturer cooperation leads to diminished energydemand. Cooperation of energy suppliers make leads to an increase in demand forhybrid products, but has no tangible effect on product prices. Competition betweensupply chain members reduces the demand for hybrid products, and thus, for energy 2. Also, theresults show that manufacturer cooperation increases the profit of the entiresupply chain and also increases product prices.
